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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Francis C. Sullivan*
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
Preliminary Examinations
Article 292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
the court, on request, prior to the finding of an indictment or
the filing of an information "shall immediately order" a pre-
liminary examination in felony cases. Although recent Louisiana
cases' have upheld the refusal of lower courts to order a pre-
liminary examination after the defendant has been indicted, and
one case 2 has held that this provision does not abolish the judge's
right to grant a continuance of a preliminary examination, State
v. Raymond3 presents an unusual twist. In this case an applica-
tion for a preliminary examination was presented to the judge
on or before October 16, 1969, and an appropriate order for the
examination was signed by the judge and left undated. On Octo-
ber 31, the court fixed the preliminary examination for Novem-
ber 10, but prior to this hearing date an indictment was returned
by the grand jury. As a result, the court refused to hold the
preliminary examination as scheduled. The supreme court denied
an application for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
Mr. Justice Barham dissented, however, pointing out that to
hold the request for preliminary examination in abeyance for
almost a month constituted a "palpable abuse" of the mandatory
provision contained in the first paragraph of article 292. The
action of a judge in delaying a prelimary examination until the
grand jury returns an indictment effectively writes the pro-
visions of article 292 out of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
opportunity to face at least some of the prosecution's witnesses
in open court at a preliminary examination is clearly a sub-
stantial advantage to a defendant, one which he is denied because
of the in camera nature of grand jury proceedings. To consider
the preliminary examination as simply an alternative method of
determining the existence of probable cause to hold an accused
to answer for a crime is to ignore the modern view of the pre-
liminary examination as a valuable and almost exclusive dis-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. State v. Manuel, 253 La. 195, 217 So.2d 369 (1968); State v. Singleton,
253 La. 18, 215 So.2d 838 (1968).
2. State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484 (1969).
3. 254 La. 911, 228 So.2d 312 (1969).
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covery device.4 Perhaps it is time for more attention to be paid
to the spirit of the law rather than merely to the letter. In this
connection serious attention might well be paid to Justice Bar-
ham's words: "The application before us reflects what may not
but could well be a design to contravene positive law and deny
relators' rights."5
Suppression of Evidence Before the Grand Jury
If the law refuses to allow the presentation of illegally ob-
tained evidence before a trial jury, should the law allow the
presentation of such evidence before a grand jury in order to
obtain an indictment? This is a matter of great dispute today,
and one that presents very serious policy considerations. The
answer, however, is now clear in Louisiana. In State v. Ander-
son6 the supreme court pointed out that no authority exists in
Louisiana for suppressing evidence presented before a grand jury.
Indicating their unwillingness to intervene in grand jury matters
via a motion to suppress, the court apparently deferred to the
directory provisions of article 442 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure to the effect that a grand jury should receive only legal
evidence. This article also provides that "no indictment shall be
quashed or conviction reversed on the ground that indictment
was based, in whole or in part, on illegal evidence. . . . " The
result in this case is based upon the view that the grand jury is
an accusatory body only and that any attempt to monitor the
evidence considered by the grand jury "would destroy the veil
of secrecy and impede the operations of the Grand Jury."' Con-
sidering the adverse effects on an accused produced by the return
of an indictment by the grand jury, one is led to question the
validity of allowing the commencement of a criminal proceeding
based upon evidence which will be inadmissible at the trial on
the issue of guilt. Perhaps the best solution to this difficulty is
the exercise of both sound discretion and good faith on the part
of the district attorneys in their choice of evidence to be pre-
sented before a grand jury. This is a partial solution only, how-
ever, since where a reasonable doubt exists as to the ultimate
4. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194
(E.D.N.Y. 1967).
5. State v. Raymond, 254 La. 911, 228 So.2d 812 (1969).
6. 254 La. 1107, 229 So.2d 829 (1969).
7. Id. at 1118, 229 So.2d at 833.
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admissibility of evidence, only a decision by a court can prove
to be a completely satisfactory answer.8
Jury Selection
The problem of the exclusion for cause of prospective jurors
in capital cases in the light of the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois9 has been presented
to the Supreme Court of Louisiana in two cases. In State v. Wil-
liamn' 0 the court held that the Witherspoon decision does not bar
voir dire examination of prospective jurors concerning their
attitude toward capital punishment nor does it bar the state's
challenge of prospective jurors who state that they could never
vote to impose the death penalty or that they would refuse even
to consider its imposition in the case before them. Justice San-
ders, speaking for the court, pointed out that the state has good
cause to challenge jurors who disclose that they would auto-
matically vote against the imposition of capital punishment with-
out regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial
of the case before them. It would seem that the court in uphold-
ing the dismissal of certain jurors for cause was influenced to a
substantial extent by the prosecutor's use of such phrases as
"under no circumstances," "irrespective of what the facts show,"
and "in no case whatsoever" during the voir dire examination.
The test formulated by the court for the exercise of such chal-
lenges was whether a juror "can consider the imposition of the
death. penalty in the case before them."" This test. was applied
to uphold the exclusion of two jurors who stated under exami-
nation that even though they could never approve the death
penalty in a prosecution for rape, they could in a murder prose-
cution such as the one before them. In State v. Poland,12 another
murder case, the prosecuting attorney informed the jury that
they had an option to find the accused guilty as charged which
would require the imposition of a death sentence or to return a
verdict of guilty without capital punishment. He then inquired
of each juror whether "knowing the law does not require you to
return a verdict carrying the death penalty, could you, under
8. See West v. United States, 359 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1966); Jones v. United
States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Note, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 578 (1968); Note,
72 YALE L.J. 590 (1963).
9. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
10. 255 La. 79, 229 So.2d 706 (1969).
11. Id. at 82, 229 So.2d at 707.
12. 255 La. 746, 232 So.2d 499 (1970).
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such circumstances, return a verdict that would carry the death
penalty?"' 8 If the answer of the juror was that he could not under
such circumstances return a verdict of guilty as charged because
he did not believe in the death penalty or for other reasons, the
juror was challenged for cause. The trial judge then undertook
a personal examination of the challenged juror in an attempt to
ascertain his ability to return a guilty verdict as charged despite
his scruples against capital punishment. The supreme court ap-
proved questioning by the judge along this line: "Say, for the
sake of argument, that, after you hear all of the evidence in the
case, argument of counsel for the state and the defendant, and
the law as given by the court, you are convinced beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of the guilt of the accused as to the crime of
murder, could you, because of your scruples, of the conscientious
scruples you entertain, bring in a verdict of guilty as charged,
knowing that if you did that, and the other jurors agreed with
you, because it has to be unanimous, the only sentence the court
could impose upon the accused would be the sentence of death.
[sic]'1 4 Since it was only when a juror stated that under no cir-
cumstances could he ever return a verdict of guilty as charged,
regardless of the evidence and the law, and his conviction as to
the guilt of the accused, that the trial judge finally excused the
juror for cause, the supreme court found this to be an appro-
priate implementation of the Witherspoon rule. This seems to
be a most reasonable and well-reasoned approach to the solu-
tion of what can be a most difficult problem, and if the tech-
niques approved by the court in these two cases are followed
there would appear to be little cause for complaint.
Guilty Pleas
As a result of the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Boykin v. Alabama,5 the record in a case must show
that a guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently made by a
defendant. In the course of Boykin the Supreme Court stated
that a guilty plea constituted a waiver of three federal consti-
tutional rights: the privilege against self-incrimination, the right
to trial by jury, and the right to confrontation. The Court spe-
cifically held: "We cannot presume a waiver of these three im-
13. Id. at 765, 232 So.2d at 506.
14. Id. at 766, 232 So.2d at 506.
15. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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portant federal rights from a silent record."16 In State ex rel.
French v. Henderson,i7 the relator entered a guilty plea to a charge
of simple burglary on June 17, 1969 (Boykin became effective
June 2, 1969). The minute entry by the court stated simply: "The
accused, being in open Court with his counsel, Samuel P. Love,
Jr., was arraigned and plead [sic] guilty. Sentence was deferred
by the Court until Friday, June 20, 1969 and the accused was
ordered remanded to jail to await sentence."' 8 An application
for writ of habeas corpus was denied by a memorandum decision
of the supreme court with Justice Barham dissenting.'9 The
minute entry seems clearly inadequate as an affirmative showing
that the guilty plea was intelligent and voluntary as required
by Boykin. It seems equally clear that in the future a clear
record consisting of an interrogation of the accused by the trial
judge will be necessary to sustain a guilty plea against a con-
stitutional attack in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. It is
difficult to understand the basis for the Supreme Court of Lou-
isiana's denial of the application for writ of habeas corpus in
this case, unless it is based upon material attached to the return
of the trial judge to which brief reference only is made in the
dissent. The record itself is insufficient to support the finding
of the court. Such action can only result in recourse to federal
remedies to the serious damage of the prestige and status of the
supreme court of this state. It should be pointed out that article
556 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that where a
defendant is not represented by counsel ifn 'a felony case, the
court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the
nature of the charge. The reporters' comments contain the fol-
lowing statement: "It may logically be assumed that a defendant
who is represented by counsel is informed as to the nature and
consequences of his plea of guilty, and that his plea is volun-
tarily entered." 20 This assumption is no longer valid as a result
of the Boykin decision, and an appropriate amendment to the
Code of Criminal Procedure setting out in detail the require-
ments which must appear in the record prior to accepting any
.plea of guilty would be highly desirable.
16. Id. at 243.
17. 255 La. 792, 232 So.2d 517 (1970).
18. Id. at 793, 232 So.2d at 517.
19. Id.
20. LA. CODE CrIM. P. art. 556, comment (b).
